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AUSTRIA BETWEEN THE EC AND CENTRAL EUROPE 
* Geoffrey C. Howes 
1. Austria is a westernized country, not yet a member of the European 
Community, with cultural, economic, and historical ties to many East-
Central and South-Eastern European countries of the fOIlner Communist 
bloc_ Thus it faces some interesting possibilities for regional identification 
and cooperation in the 1990s. On the one hand, this small state gravitates 
toward the European Community, with which it shares postwar free-market 
economic development, and the now very large state of Germany, with 
which it shares a linguistic, a cultural, and a certain political tradition. On 
the other hand there is Austria's connection with Central Europe, as one of a 
number of small states that by dint of size, location, and history share 
important interests. The three watersheds of Getman unification, the advent 
of national self-determination in Eastern Europe, and Austria's application 
for membership in the European Community make these two directions in 
its relationship with the rest of Europe current and vital for a country that 
even before these developments had often been forced to confront the 
question of its identity. 
The historical roots of Austria's intermediate position lie in the role 
that the Habsburg empire, the predecessor of the first and second Austrian 
republics, adopted in the politics of nationalism and Getman unification in 
the nineteenth century. The competition of the Austrian Empire with 
Prussia for leadership within the German-speaking world and Central Europe 
placed the Habsburg state in what Robert A. Kann terms an "insoluble 
dilemma."1 If it were to pursue its Getman interests, it would have to follow 
the policy of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, prime minister from 1848 to 
1852, and abandon its semifeudal conservative tradition to become a more 
efficient, modem, centralized state that could rival Prussia. But this would 
endanger the domestic policy of controlling and protecting the diverse 
nationalities of East-Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe, a difficult 
task in the face of Russian imperial designs and Panslavic nationalist 
agitation.2 After Schwarzenberg's death in 1852, Austria chose the more 
conservative approach, and the disintegration of Austrian power began: the 
defeats by the French and Sardinians in 1859 and by the Prussians in 1866, 
the Hungarian Compromise of 1867, and the First World War. 
In the 1850s, Habsburg Austria was pulled between confederation with 
the German states, which would entail a loss of dynastic influence, and 
retention of its dynastic power, which would entail a loss of influence in 
* Revised version of paper presented at the AAASS 23rd Annual Convention. Miami. FL. 
November 1991. 
I Robert A Kann, History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press. 1974).266. 
2 See Kann. 266-69. 
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Germany and a loss of favor with the West. In the late 1980s and early 90s, 
the Austrian Republic has chosen between confederation with the European 
Community, which entails a certain loss of domestic sovereignty, and 
continued non-alignment, which would entail forfeiture of the benefits of 
EC membership, not to mention the necessity of competing with that vast 
trading bloc. One fundamental question is the same now as it was then: do 
Austria's interests lie mainly in the West and Germany, or in East-Central 
Europe and the (fonner) Habsburg lands? 
The choices in the 1990s do not constitute a "dilemma," nor do they 
exclude each other; in fact Austria is proceeding vigorously with both its 
accession to the EC and its political and economic cooperation with 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Slovenia, and other Eastern and Central 
European countries. Yet the respective emphasis apportioned to the two 
sides of this question by the Austrian leadership and citizenry during the 
next few years could have profound and lasting consequences for the 
republic. For this reason I would like in the following to review the 
. question of Austrian regional identity from several perspectives. First, I 
shall briefly summarize the recent discussion of Austrian national identity, 
especially as it relates to joining the European Community. Then I shall 
consider several notions of what "Central Europe" is, and what it could 
mean for Austria. Within this framework I shall review Austrian actions in 
the past few years that evince a marked orientation either to the European 
Community (and hence Germany) or to Central Europe. As a particular case 
of the possibilities of Central European regional cooperation I shall 
concentrate on Austrian relations with Slovenia. Rounding this off will be a 
summary of what I see as Austria's prospects and possibilities. 
2. In a recent work on the perennial subject of Austrian identity, the 
Innsbruck political scientist Anton Pelinka (1990) finds that Austria shares 
a peculiar situation with Belgium and (what was then) Yugoslavia, to the 
extent that a solution to their respective national questions could threaten 
their very existence as states. The Flemings, however, are drawn to the 
Netherlands, and the Walloons gravitate to France; and Yugoslavia is 
breaking into new nation-states. But there is no major national split within 
Austria. As Pelinka puts it: "The question of Austrian identity is thus the 
question whether Austria does exist as a separate political, cultural, 
economic entity or whether it simply does not."3 
This puts Austrians in a position where the desire for a nation-state is 
not, indeed cannot be, the same as nationalism. Germanonationalism can 
logically desire only the extinction of Austria as a political entity. And 
while the right-wing populist Jorg ~~ider of the Austrian Liberal Party 
(Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs, FPO) has gained some support for his 
emphasis on the Germanness of Austrians, polls show that Austrian 
identification with the Second Republic has grown steadily since 1955. In 
1989, nearly 80% of Austrians expressed belief in Austria as a nation, up 
3 Anton Pelinka, Zur osterreichischen Indentitiit: Zwischen deutscher Vereinigung und 
Mitteleuropa (Wien: Ueberreuter, 1990) 10. All translations from Gel man to English are 
the author's. 
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from just under 50% in 1956; and the percentage of those disavowing an 
Austrian nation sank from over 45% to less than 10% in the same period.4 
Devotion to Austria as the state now exists is of course patriotism, that is, 
devotion to the political entity, and not nationalism, that is, devotion to the 
Volk. This division between ethnicity and patria is the crux of the Austrian 
identity crisis to the extent that it still exists: Austria is Gelman, yet not 
German. If its Gellnanness is carried to its logical consequence, Austria 
would no longer be Austria. But is there an alternative to Gellnanness, 
namely, a cultural Austrianness determined by more than identification with 
the state? There are several possible answers. 
The immediate practical answer, the basis of the Second Republic's 
existence as a state, is rooted in the notion that Austria was mainly a victim 
rather than a perpetrator of Nazism, and thus not to be identified with 
Germany. This attitude, based on the Moscow Declaration of 1943 and the 
1955 State Treaty, pervaded the first two decades of Austrian independence, 
giving Austrians a sort of fortuitous identity as a neutral product of the 
Second World War, unique in its intactness and independence from the 
Eastern and Western blocs. But it also allowed them to disregard their 
ambiguous past, and a Vergangenheitsbewiiltigung a coming to terms 
with the past on the scale of West Germany's never took place. Of late, 
politicians like Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky have corrected this 
historical distortion somewhat with a more balanced view: some Austrians 
were victims and some, they admit, were perpetrators.5 
A number of Austrian intellectuals view neutrality as an Austrian virtue 
that is threatened by joining the EC. They see a strict interpretation of the 
State Treaty of 1955 as an important barrier to being pulled back into the 
sphere of German influence, which would only encourage the illiberal 
tendencies already present in Austria. Among the more emphatic of these are 
the writers and critics Michael Scharang, Josef Haslinger, and Peter Turrini. 
Scharang, for example, writes that the new postwar Austrian consciousness, 
although preferable to a pan-Gelman identity, is based on a lie and therefore 
has permitted a not-so-hidden National-Socialist continuity in the Second 
Republic.6 An alternative to this blurring of history for the sake of feeling 
good, honestly or not, about one's past would have been the exploitation of 
postwar Austria's strengths. For Scharang, these were strong nationalized 
industries and a near monopoly in trade with Eastern Europe.? These have 
been progressively lost, as have the chances for political advantage that 
Haslinger describes: demilitarization, freedom from bloc-based political 
polarizing, and a historically aware public critical consciousness.8 Turrini 
4 Pelinka, 17. 
S Vranitzky: Viele .jlaben Widerstand geleistet, viele haben den AnschluB begJiiBt," 
Informationen aus Osterreich 15191 (23 Ju11991) 2. 
6 Michael Scharang, "Dies~n Staat kann kein Skandal erschiittem, denn er ist selbst ein 
Skandal" in Das Wunder Osterreich oder wie es in einem Land immer besser und dabei 
immer schlec.!uer wird. Essays, Polemiken, Glossen (Wien, Ziirich: EU~9paverlag, 1989) 37. 
7 Scharang, "Osterreich (ge)denkt, Deutschland lenkt" i,!. Das Wunder Osterreich, 167. 
8 Josef Haslinger, Politik der Gefiihle: Ein Essay uber Osterreich (Dallllstadt: Luchterhand, 
1987) 142. 
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seeks in vain for a homeland a Heimat where quality of life and 
justice outweigh economic considerations,9 and he compares Austria's 
relationship with Germany to a prostitute's with her client. 1O Thus these 
three define Austrianness variously as neutrality, independence from 
Germany, inherence in both Western and Eastern Europe, and socialism with 
a human face. Their critiques, whatever virtues they might have, bespeak a 
curious left-wing conservatism that regards Austria's pre-EC status as 
protection against losing the "third way" between international capitalism 
and communism. 
The political scientists Margit Scherb and Inge Morawetz argue that the 
practical erosion of a separate Austrian identity need not await accession to 
the EC.lI The tying of the schilling to the deutschmark, the trade imbalance 
with the Federal Republic, and the extensive "internationalization" of 
Austrian capital and media largely at the hands of German investors -
all speak for the actual dependence of Austria on Germany and the EC, in 
spite of continued political independence. 12 All of the writers mentioned 
share the conviction that Austria's political independence cannot be 
maintained without economic independence; thus they reject both a 
historical national identification and a future economic identification with 
Germany through the EC. 
Even if one accepts political and economic independence as one basis of 
Austrian identity, this still leaves unanswered the question whether there 
actually is a separate Austrian national or cultural identity. The journalist 
and politician Gunther Nenning speaks of a greater German imaginative or 
spiritual empire a Geisterreich which flourishes only so long as it is 
not identical with a political state. 13 "The nation-state, a miscarriage of the 
19th century, is everywhere a sin against the spirit of diversity, against the 
holy crazy quilt of nations and peoples, landscapes and cities, languages and 
dialects."14 A cultural empire tolerates and promotes differences, whereas a 
nation-state wipes them out. If it is not to present a threat to Austria's 
uniqueness, Austrian Germanness can exist solely on a cultural level. That 
uniqueness consists for Nenning precisely in Austria's historical ability to 
9 Peter Turrini, "Heimat, deine Verriickten" in Mein Osterreich: Reden, Polemiken, AuJsatze 
(DaJ mstadt: Luchterhand, 1988) 91..-102. 
10 Turrini, "Die Deutschen und die Osterreicher Chronik einer touristischen Begegnung" 
in Mein Osterreich, 137-47. 
II Margit Scherb und Inge Morawetz, eds., In deutscher Hand? Osterreich und sein grofter 
Nachbar (Wien: Verlag fur Gesellschaftskritik, 1990) xi. 
12 All of these issues are addressed in contributions to the Scherb-Morawetz book. On the 
currency question and international trade, see Scherb, "Wir und die westeuropiiische 
ljegemonialmacht," 27-59; on internationalization, see Morawetz, "Schwellenland 
Osterreich? Aktuelle Veriinderungen der osterreichischen Eigentumsstruktur im Sog der 
Internationalisierungsstrategien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," 87-112; on media 
ownership see Hans Heinz Fabris, "Medi<;.nkolonie na und?" 113-29. 
13 Gunther Nenning, Grenzenlos deutsch:.Osterreichs Heimkehr ins Jalsche Reich (Munchen: 
Knesebeck & Schuler, 1988) 12-20. Nenning maintains that the opposite of the mind or 
spirit (Geist) is the state, and that the Gelman spiritual or mental empire (including Austria) 
has flourished, while German states have been catastrophes (I 4-15). The true empire of 
the Gel1l1ans has always consisted of nothing but secondary Gel man states and never of a 
primary one." (15) 
I Nenning, 21. 
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be culturally German and supranational while remaining politically non-
German. He does not ignore German hegemony under Habsburg, the 
Anschluss period, or present-day xenophobia in Austria, but he recognizes a 
countercurrent tradition as well that he defines as Austrian: 
It is impossible to imagine what would have happened if my 
imperial-royal ancestors had had enough intelligence to manage 
the impossible reconstruction of the old Empire into a halfway 
democratic federal state. Because Austrians find East and West 
equally weird, between them there would lie a solid Central 
Europe with four or five capitals: Vienna, Prague, Ljubljana, 
Zagreb these three are west of Vienna! , Budapest, and 
maybe a couple others; a real federation of states should be 
motley, preferably with a motley crew of capitals. IS 
A more optimistic voice, the late journalist and politician JOrg Mauthe, 
also emphasizes the cultural identity of Austria. He worries not so much 
about the dominance of Gelluany over Austria as about the Austrian as his 
own worst enemy, who makes "typically Austrian" into a pejorative phrase 
denoting sloppiness or failure. 16 Mauthe counters the prevailing pessimism 
with examples of Austria's successes in literature, science, and the visual 
and performing arts, distinctions out of proportion to Austria's smallness. 
Anton Pelinkasummarizes the threats to a separate Austrian identity-
the insufficient critical distance from the past, the selling of Austria to 
outsideinterests, and the Austrian's own conflicted sense of identity but 
sees them also as quintessentially Austrian, as a national burden that needs 
to be offset by setting a new course, which he refers to as the "fifth 
Austria." The first through fourth Austrias were the monarchy, the First 
Republic, the Austro-Fascist Corporate State, and the Second Republic 
insofar as it has been marked by excessive identification with subnational 
loyalties, namely socialist and Christian democratic political camps. I? 
Pelinka's book continues the critical tone of Scharang, Scherb and 
Morawetz, and others, but he is most critical not of Gelman leanings, but of 
Austrian business-as-usual: the politics of the elite. 
The book also contains cautious optimism: Pelinka wrote it after the 
radical changes of 1989 and 1990, and the opening of Eastern Europe seems 
to present alternatives both to a party-book bureaucracy and to ingestion by 
the Western European economic leviathan. Unlike Nenning, however, 
Pelinka sees no definitive possibility in Austria's identifying itself with 
Central Europe: "Austria has set itself off from Central Europe. Austria 
is defending its privileges."ls History has made Austria part of western 
Europe. As a balance to German domination, Pelinka likes the Swiss 
IS Nenning, 194. 
16 Jorg Mauthe, Der Weltuntergang zu Wien und wie man ihn iiberlebt. Austriakische 
Einsichten in zukiinftige Aussichten (Wien: Edition Atelier, 1989) 143. 
17 Pelinka, 13-19. 
18 Pelinka, 137. 
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model, which shows that "small is beautiful," more than the Central 
European model. 19 
3. But what is Central Europe? Like Austrian identity, the notion of 
Central Europe has been subject to historical change and to various 
interpretations. These fall mainly into two categories, political and cultural, 
with the political interpretations coming mainly from Eastern Europe and 
the cultural versions dominating in the West. . 
"Central Europe" in the understanding of Gyorgy Konrad is a conceptual 
alternative to "Eastern Europe," which was defined by the bisecting of 
Europe by the superpowers. In the eighties the Central European idea offered 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland the possibility of self-definition. "The 
one pole is political power with only one center. The other pole is 
intellectual power with many centers."20 This describes Konrad's notion of 
"antipolitics:" the very idea of politics, the mere interest in power, militates 
against "middle European modernism," which for Konrad means a measured 
and deliberate maintenance of national and regional historical strands that the 
communist manipulation of history tried to sever.21 Konrad's interest while 
Hungary was still totalitarian was to discover "What can one still do when 
one can do practically nothing?"22 "Central Europe" meant for him "Eastern 
Europe" as an abstract possibility. 
As Timothy Garton Ash wrote in 1986, "antipolitics" of one sort or 
another also lay at the root of the Central European conceptions of Vaclav 
Havel, Adam Michnik, and Milan Kundera. In spite of the often great 
differences among these writers, they share a tendency toward a sort of 
mythopoesis, "the inclination to attribute to the Central European past what 
you hope will characterize the Central European future .... "23 Thus, under 
communism, the pursuit of the Central European was a pursuit within the 
imagination; Garton Ash writes: "This is where Central Europe confronts 
Eastern Europe: in the autonomous sphere of culture, in the kingdom of the 
spirit. "24 The phrase is reminiscent of Nenning' s Geisterreich of Germany, 
and reflects the same trust in the mind in the face of political obstacles. 
Given the difficulties of the German and Austrian past, one might say that 
Nenning pursues historical antipolitics. 
For Czeslaw Milosz, the historical creation of this Central Europe 
includes Gelman influence as well. At a Budapest Roundtable discussion in 
June 1989, whose record appears in the 1991 Cross Currents yearbook, he 
said: "I would risk a very simple definition of Central Europe: all the 
countries that in August 1939 were the real or hypothetical object of a trade 
19 Pelinka, 146-51. Pelinka's assertion that Austria is part of the west is cleru:.1y supported by 
offical Austrian policy; see, for example, ::Vranitzky: klare Orientierung Osterreichs zum 
europaischen Westen," Informationen aus Osterreich 1/90 (I Jan 1990) 3. 
20 Gyorgy Konrad, "Die Schlangelstrategie der osteuropaischen Befreiung" in Antipolitik: 
Mitteleuropiiische Meditiationen, tr. Hans-Henning Paetzke (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp) 
116. 
21 Konrad, "Die paradoxe Mitte" in Antipolitik, 113. 
22 Konrad, "Die Schlangelstrategie" 119. 
23 Timothy Garton Ash, "Does Central Europe Exist?" in The Uses of Adversity: Essays on 
the Fate of Central Europe (New York: Random House, 1989), 184. 
24 Garton Ash, 193. 
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between the Soviet Union and Germany. This means not only the area 
usually associated with the idea of centrality, but also the Baltic states ... " 25 
Thus both Konrad and Milosz stress recent history in their definitions. 
Others bolster the claim for a distinct Central European identity by going 
farther back into history. Milan Kundera, for example, traces "Central 
Europe" to the baroque, which imposed "a certain cultural unity on the 
region, which is multinational and thus polycentric ... "26 This variety made 
possible in the twentieth century the cultural revolts of psychoanalysis and 
the great interwar novelists. After 1945 , "Austria's cultural marginality and 
the political nonexistence of the other countries make Central Europe a 
premonitory mirror showing the possible fate of all of Europe."27 This 
warning of 1986 sounds quite different today, of course, but precisely what 
then seemed crushed by ideology now offers an enticing possibility: unity 
through variety. 
This is the motto employed by the late Magyar-Austrian Gyorgy 
Sebestyen, who finds Central Europe distinctive in its role as a border 
region with a multitude of ethnic layers, a "gigantic graveyard of peoples."2s 
These have been mainly small peoples, often threatened by greater powers, 
often occupied, and thereby culturally fertilized. This circumstance has led to 
peculiarly Central European versions of the great European cultural 
developments: a Renaissance without direct ancient examples and with urban 
centers distinct from the Western tradition of early urbanization; a 
Reformation strengthened by Ottoman support against the 
CounterrefoIlnation and by latent antiroman, antiwestern traditions alongside 
ancient religions; and an Enlightenment that was to become the driving 
force of nationalism, which in tum was a chief feature of Central European 
Romanticism.29 Sebestyen expressly includes Austria in a Central Europe 
thus defined.30 
Also looking for the historical roots of the Mitteleuropa discussion, the 
Hungarian historian Peter Hanak maintains that Mitteleuropa has existed 
since the Middle Ages as a mediating subregion between West and East, as 
these were defined chiefly by the 11th-century schism.31 The telln itself 
gained currency in the 19th century. Hanak identifies several traits of the 
region that stem from its transitional character, including religious 
pluralism, the relative freedom and assimilation of the Jews, relatively 
autonomous and organic capitalist development, and a middle class that 
25 H.C. Artmann, Peter Esterhazy, Danilo Kis, Gyorgy Konrad, Edward Limonov, Claudio 
Magris, Miklos Meszoly, Adam Michnik, Czeslaw Milosz, and Paul-Eerik Rummo, "The 
Budapest Roundtable," Cross Currents JO (1991) 18. 
26 Milan Kundera, "Central Europe" from "Sixty-three Words" in The Art of the Novel, tr. 
Linda Asher (New York: Grove Press, 1988) 124; also see his now-famous essay "The 
Central European Tragedy" in The New York Review of Books (April 26, 1984). 
21 Kundera, 125. 
28 Gyorgy Sebestyen, "Die Kultur des Donauraumes Einheit durch Vielfalt" in Notizen 
eines Mitteleuropiiers (Wien: Edition Atelier, 1990) 56. 
29 Sebestyen, 62-6~. 
30 Sebestyen, "Osterreich kleines Welttheater im Donauraum," in Notizen eines 
Mitteleuropiiers, 78-88. 
31 Peter Hanak, "Mitteleuropa eine imaginare Realitat" in Heino Berg and Peter 
BUJIlleister, eds., Mitteleuropa und die deutsche Frage (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1990) 49. 
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established less liberalism than in Western Europe, but more than in Eastern 
Europe. Like Sebestyen, Hanak finds unique cultural movements, such as 
the Biedenneier.32 He differentiates this Mitteleuropa from West German 
notions and predicts for it an essential integrative function in Europe.33 
Western thinkers on Mitteleuropa tend not so much to stress political 
and historical factors as to dwell on the shared culture of the region, which 
is less sharply defined and thus admits of greater inclusiveness. John Willett 
sees a Central European configuration in Berlin, Prague, and Vienna, thus 
shifting the center of the Center rather north and west of the more 
commonly cited Prague-Vienna-Budapest triangle.34 This germanocentric 
view is based on Willett's claim that "the search for a Central European 
culture [ ... ] begins with [the] ancient traces of Germanic colonization" in 
Eastern Europe.35 Willett also identifies Central European culture in the 
twentieth century with modernism. On the other hand, another Gellnanist, 
• 
Claudio Magris, speaks of "German-Magyar-Slavic-Romanic-Jewish Central 
Europe, polemically opposed to the Gellnanic Reich" and quotes Johannes 
Urzidil's pun "hinternational" to describe "a tolerant association of peoples" 
under the Habsburgs.36 He further examines the "disputed link between 
Central Europe and Germanism" and finds that there are benign and 
malignant versions of a Central Europe infused by German culture, from 
Heinrich von Sbrik's Habsburg universalism to Hitler's cruel domination.37 
At any rate, Magris says: "Today, questioning oneself about Europe means 
asking oneself how one relates to Gellnany."38 
4. This brings us back to our main question: how does Austria relate 
to Europe, and hence to Germany? Identifying with Central Europe would 
require of Austria patience and humility. It would require acknowledging that 
Austria's good fortune in 1955 was precisely that, and that the advantages of 
thirty-five years of unfettered Western-style development do not outweigh 
the shared culture as defined by Sebestyen, Hanak, Kundera, and Magris. 
This development is a sticking point both for the Austrians and for the 
Eastern Europeans, who often think of Austria as part of Central Europe 
only in historical terms, relegating the present republic to the West. That 
Austria was not in the Soviet sphere seems to be a barrier to its being 
Central European, especially since many, including Konrad and Milosz, 
have defined Central Europe as non-Soviet Eastern Europe. 
On the German side of the question one must ask whether Austria's 
casting its lot with the EC is simply economic expedience; or is it a way to 
regain the Austrian dream, destroyed between 1866 and 1918, of being a 
European force to be reckoned with? Is it a means to survival as a small 
state or is it a means to avoid being a small state? Proponents argue that 
32 Hanak, 50-54. 
33 Hanak, 57. 
34 John Willett, "Is there a Central European Culture?" Cross Currents 10 (1991) 1-15. 
35 Willett, 2. 
36 Claudio Magris, Danube, tr. Patrick Creagh (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1989) 
29-30. 
37 Magris, 31. 
38 Magris, 32. 
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Austria's separate identity is secure, and that the country should not be shut 
off from the promising European economic development. Opponents say 
that the EC will compromise Austria's sovereignty; the more radical among 
them say the EC is just a way for Germany to reconquer Austria without all 
the military and political bother. 
Whatever one's opinion might be, the fact is that Austria will join the 
EC. It fonnally applied in the summer of 1989 and in July 1991 the EC 
Commission recommended Austria's accession. A poll taken in July and 
August 1991 showed that 55% of Austrians were in favor of joining, and 
that only 5% saw EC membership as a threat to Austrian neutrality.39 There 
are indications, however, that Austria is joining the EC not as an equal 
partner, but as an economic dependent of Germany. Austria's import-export 
ratio with Gellnany was about 4:3 in 1991.40 More than 1/3 of foreign 
direct investments in Austria come from Germany, the largest single 
source.41 West Gellnans have a significant interest in about 70% of Austrian 
daily newspapers up from zero in 1987.42 It is clear that in a practical 
sense the Gelman orientation of Austria is prevailir.g. This is true of its EC 
orientation as well, which has accounted for an increasing proportion of 
Austrian imports and exports since 1970, while the proportion traded with 
Eastern Europe and EFT A countries has declined in those years.43 
There is, however, also a Central European orientation, as a few facts 
will show. Austrian exports to Eastern Europe have risen steadily, as have 
imports from Eastern Europe. As of 1991, Austria was Hungary's second 
most important trade partner next to Gellnany, and it held first place in trade 
with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.44 As for joint ventures, only Gennany 
has more with Eastern Europe in general. Austria was involved in 1991 in 
about 15% of all joint ventures, of which about 50% were with Hungary, 
20% with Yugoslavia, and 17% with Czechoslovakia.45 There is hope for a 
mid-European industrial zone, which the Rhine-Main-Danube canal, which 
opened in September 1992, could make a reality. 46 Many foreign countries 
see Austria as a "bridgehead" for Eastern European investment. 
Austria, being stronger, will have to observe carefully the line between 
cooperation and exploitation, however. It is possible to infer a patronizing 
attitude in statements such as Chancellor Vranitzky's that "there is at 
present no more important political task than to effect the connection of 
[Eastern Europe] to Western Europe," while pointing out Austria's "special 
39 "Mehrheit der Osterreicher fur EG-Beitritt," Informationen aus Osterreich 17/91 (3 Sep 
1991)3. 
40 Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1991,97; this did show some improvement over the year 
before, however. 
41 Scherb, "Wir und die westeuropiiische Hegemonia1macht," 37-38. 
42 Fabris, 116. 
43 Austrian Foreign Pl?!icy Yearbook 1991,98. 
44 Iryformationen aus Osterreich. .. 
45 "Osterreich zweitgroBter Kooperationspartner Osteuropas," Informationen aus Osterreich 
4191 (19 Feb 1991) 4. 
46 See "The Danube Commission" in Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1991 (Vienna: The 
Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1991),55-56. 
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function" in this effort.47 Nor does the fact that Austria holds more Eastern 
European debt than any other country bespeak a relationship among equals. 
Austria's participation as one among many Central European countries 
seems clearer when we tum our attention to cultural exchanges. Minister for 
Scientific Research Erhard Busek has been particularly energetic in 
establishing, for example, a treaty on cultural exchange with Hungary and 
an Austrian-Croatian friendship society.48 The Austrian People's Party held 
its May festival in 1991 in a town near the triple border of Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and Vice Chancellor Josef Riegler extolled 
the cooperation of the three neighbors.49 There are Austrian schools in 
Prague and Budapest; there is a new Austrian library in Bratislava, and there 
have been joint Central European art exhibitions and concerts. Speaking in 
June in Sopron, Chancellor Vranitzky encouraged increased cooperation 
within the "Pentagonale" of Austria, Italy, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and 
Yugoslavia50 (now the "Central European Initiative," including Poland, 
Slovenia, and Croatia) . .i / This economic, ecological, cultural, and political 
cooperative was begun in 1989, alongside the well-established Alpe-Adria 
cooperative, which was founded in 1978. In addition to the north-south 
A1pe-Adria group, a Danube Commission has operated since 1948, and since 
1989 there has been a Cooperative of Danube Lands.52 
Economic and cultural relations based on regional rather than national 
considerations have long been a feature of Central and South-East Europe;53 
the Communist period may have discouraged them and made them more 
difficult, but it did not eliminate them. As an example of this productive 
regionalism let us look at Austrian cooperation with Slovenia. In concert 
with cultural treaties between Austria and Yugoslavia in 1974, 1977, 1980, 
and 1987, cooperation especially between the southern Austrian provinces of 
Carinthia and Styria and Slovenia has been quite active. In fact, Carinthia 
was the first province after the war to take up somewhat regular cultural 
exchanges with Yugoslavia, above all Slovenia.54 By the nineteen-seventies 
there were regular exchanges in the areas of opera, music perfOImance, radio 
47 "Vranitzky: Osten an Westeuropa anbinden," Informationen aus Osterreich 17/91 (3 Sep 
1991)3. 
48 "Kulturabkommen zwischen JJngam und Osterreich" Informationen aus Osterreich 5/90 
(§ Mar 1990) 7; "Kroatisch-Osterreichische Gesellschaft gegriindet," Informationen aus 
Osterreich 6/91 (19 Mar 1991) 6. Busek gave a speech on the topic of Central Europe at 
the .. opening ceremonies. .. 
49 "OVP-Maifeier im "DreiHindereck," Informationen aus Osterreich 10/91 (14 May 1991) 
2. 
•• 
50 •• "Vranitzky fur breitere Zusammenarbeit von Osterreich und Ungam," Informationen aus 
Osterreich 13/90 (26 Jun 1990) 2. 
51 "The Central European Initiative" in Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1991,53-55. 
52 On Austria's participation in the Central European Initiative and the Cooperative of 
Danube Lands, see Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1991,53-56; on Alpe-Adria and the 
Confederation of Danube Lands, see Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1990,7-14; on 
Alpe-Adria, see the five contributions in Slovene Studies 10 (1988) 1:3-38. 
53 See for example Peter Vodopivec, "Commentary: the Historical Background of Alpe-
Adria Cooperation" (Slovene Studies 10, 1988, 15-19), which traces such cooperation back 
to the I 820s (15). 
54 Werner Weilguni, Osterreichisch-Jugoslawische Kulturbeziehungen 1945-1989 (Wien: 
Verlag fur Geschichte und Politik; MOnchen: R. Oldenbourg, 1990), 70. 
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broadcasts, literary readings, and artistic symposia.55 In 1946, Styria also 
started exchanges with Slovenia (and later Croatia as well). The University 
for Pedagogical Sciences in Klagenfurt, as well as the University of Graz, 
the Technical University in Graz, and the Mining College in Leoben, all 
have various sorts of exchanges with Ljubljana or Maribor.56 Many of the 
initiatives for cultural cooperation have originated with the Slovene 
minority in Carinthia.57 This points up one of the important functions of 
regional cooperation, especially as pursued by the Alpe-Adria Working 
Community, namely, the promotion of ethnic understanding and minority 
rights.58 The goal is what supposedly existed under Habsburg: tolerance, 
polycentrism, multinationalism. 
This goal is neither simple nor easy; the complexity of Austrian 
relations with other Central European countries was demonstrated by the 
civil war in Slovenia and Croatia. Officially, the government waited until 
the Yugoslav federal army went too far before recognizing the new 
republics. Informally, however, the old Austrian anti-Serbian sentiment and 
perhaps a certain Habsburg sentimentality pushed Austrian reactions beyond 
neutrality. Weapons exports to Slovenia were prohibited, but only after 2 
weeks of fighting; and the governors of Carinthia, Styria, Upper Austria, 
and Vienna took part in the celebration of Slovene independence. 
While this shows a certain Central European solidarity, one hopes that 
the reasons behind it are forward-looking rather than mainly historical. 
Many Austrians seem more ready to champion the Slovene cause when the 
Slovenes are in Slovenia, and not citizens of Carinthia, where there has 
always been resistence to expressions of national pride and cultural 
autonomy on the part of the Slovene minority. Thomas M. Barker's book 
The Slovene Minority of Carinthia59 reports occasional physical assaults on 
the students and faculty of the Slovene high school in Klagenfurt (249); 
German nationalist propaganda against supposed government favoritism 
toward Slovenes (250); increasing tension and confrontations between 
Gelman nationalists and Carinthian Slovenes (253); social pressures 
restricting the use of the Slovene language to only the private sphere (263); 
and anti-Slovene incidents connected with the censuses of 1961, 1971, and 
1976 (a special census to determine the population base for implementing 
minority rights) (290-91). As evidence of a lack of commitment to Slovene 
minority rights on the part of the federal government, Barker cites the 1972 
"Town Markers" affair, in which attempts to fulfill the minority-protection 
provisions of the Austrian State Treaty, by putting up signs in Slovene, 
were bureaucratically limited and half-hearted, and official reaction against 
the destruction of Slovene-language signs was negligible.6°For now, the 
political weight of Gelman nationalists in Austria seems greater than the 
55 Weilguni, 70. 
56 Weilguni, 52-55. 
57 Weilguni, 78-80. 
58 See Silvo Devetak, "The Alpe-Adria as a Multinational Region," Slovene Studies 10 
(1988), 27-35. 
59 East European Monographs 169 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). 
60 Barker, 281-83. 
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concern for the Slovene minority. Perhaps continued regional cooperation 
and understanding can make a small contribution to changing this. 
5. As it now appears, Austria is pursuing an increasing economic and 
hence political identification with Germany, via the Ee. The cultural 
identification with Germany, a historical given, shows no serious tendency 
at the moment to become distorted in the direction of ethnic pan-
Germanism, but this is of course always a danger, especially given the 
increase in occasions for xenophobia, that most pernicious form of 
nationalism. 
As for Austria's Central-European orientation, the reality seems to be 
the regional work being done in the Danube group, the Alpe-Adria group, 
and in bilateral exchanges and cooperation. The concept of a tolerant, 
polycentric Mitteleuropa as propounded by Sebestyen, Nenning, Hanak, and 
Magris has suffered a great break in continuity, and if anything can establish 
a new Central European regionalism, it will be present efforts in response to 
immediate practical needs. This does not mean that past connections will be 
irrelevant; only that they must be reactivated and re-evaluated. Austria could 
establish itself within a Habsburg empire without the empire, that is, 
within a multicultural region without Vienna as its German political center. 
Such an identification would build upon the past; indeed, it would restore 
desirable aspects of the past obscured by Soviet domination and the Cold 
War, while accepting Austria for what it is in the present and the future: a 
small state among other small states. Although Austria's smallness is the 
result of external forces, as Pelinka points out, it could be turned to 
Austria's advantage. "Smallness promotes identity .... Smallness promotes 
political quality. "61 That this is true even within the EC has been 
demonstrated by Denmark, a small nation that, at this writing, is holding up 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, probably out of concern about the 
loss of national identity and sovereignty. 
The critics mentioned earlier, Scharang, Turrini, Morawetz, and Scherb, 
do not go very far in suggesting what one would be defending by keeping 
Austria out of the EC, and Germany out of Austrian affairs. A Central 
European identification under the motto "small is beautiful" could very well 
supply Austria with a modem raison d' etre that goes beyond the old notions 
of antifascism and neutrality. Many Austrians, more so than most Germans 
outside the south, identify strongly with their sub national regions; for 
example, many Carinthians feel Carinthian first, German second, and 
Austrian third, just as Vorarlbergers, Scots, Maritime Canadians, and 
Catalonians identify more strongly with their regions and ethnic groups than 
with the political entities they belong to. This indicates that the model of 
regional cooperation is already at work within Austria, and perhaps only 
needs to be transferred to international, or intraregional, cooperation. 
The European Single Market with Germany as its largest component 
exerts a strong pull. It may be that Austria will need its role in Central 
Europe to offset its marginal position in a united Europe. And it may be 
61 Pelinka, 147-48. 
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that new states like Slovenia can use their solidarity with Austria and other 
states in the region to a similar purpose. It could tum out that Austria is 
Austrian only to the extent that it is Central European, and that a solid, 
culturally-based regional identity is needed to counterbalance an abstract, 
economically-based European identity. 
Bowling Green State University 
POVZETEK 
A VSTRIJA MED EVROPSKO SKUPNOSTJO IN 
SREDNJO EVROPO 
Dasi se ne clanica Evropske gospodarske skupnosti, je Avstrija po svojih tesnih 
kulturnih, gospodarskih in zgodovinskih vezeh z mnogimi vzhodno-
srednjeevropskimi in jugovzhodnimi evropskimi deielami vsekakor del 
Zahodne Evrope. Kot taka je v desetletju, v katerem smo, postavljena pred vrsto 
zanimivih moi nosti podrocne identifikacije in regionalnega sodelovanja. 
Clanek je posveeen razmisljanju 0 teh gravitacijskih silnicah Avstrije danes. Po 
kratki ocenitvi najnovejsih razPravljanj 0 avstrijski identiteti, ki jih je pobudila 
prosnja Avstrije za vstop v Evropsko skupnost, se avtor ustavlja ob vee 
konceptih "Srednje Evrope." V tem okviru teee razprava 0 avstrijskih potezah 
zadnjih nekaj let, razlicnih in deljenih med Evropsko skupnostjo in Srednjo 
Evropo. Avstrijski odnosaji s Slovenijo nudijo avtorju lep primer moinosti za 
regionalno sodelovanje. 
